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I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the Voting Rights Act of 19651 ("VRA"') lies the
controversial Section 5. Section 5 requires select regions of the
United States with a history of disenfranchising minorities to seek
federal approval before modifying any local voting procedures. 2
Reauthorized by Congress as recently as 2006,3 Section 5 was
originally enacted in 1965 under the enforcement provision of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 4 The purpose of the VRA was to eliminate
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1994)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
3. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reau-
thorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81.
See also Nw. AUSTIN MUN. UTIL. DIST. No. ONE v. HOLDER, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2009).
4. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The first section of the
Fifteenth Amendment states as follows: 'The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
67
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the taint of racial discrimination in the voting process that had
been repeated in parts of the country for nearly one hundred
years.5 Due to its effectiveness, Section 5 became the cornerstone
of the VIRA and is still largely recognized as one of the most effec-
tive pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted.6
The purpose of this comment is to discuss whether or not Con-
gress possessed the constitutional authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment to reauthorize Section 5 where the historical patterns
of systematic disenfranchisement have largely ceased in the cov-
ered regions. While supporters of reauthorization are quick to
point out that this cessation was achieved only because of the en-
actment of Section 5,7 a legitimate question now arises concerning
whether or not the preclearance requirement is still needed con-
sidering its effectiveness at eliminating the past methods used by
the covered jurisdictions to deviously promote racial discrimina-
tion at the polls.
To complicate matters, the United States Supreme Court pro-
nounced two standards for evaluating congressional legislation
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The first standard is found in the seminal case of South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,8 where the United States Supreme Court upheld
the original enactment of the VRA against constitutional chal-
lenges raised by South Carolina and other supporting states.9
Under this particular standard, the Supreme Court paid a high
level of deference to Congress's findings that the VRA was neces-
sary to combat the persistent discrimination found at the polls and
that the piecemeal approach of litigating individual cases was far
too burdensome.' 0 This same deferential standard was the one
adopted by the United States Supreme Court as it struck down, on
four different occasions, various constitutional challenges to the
congressional reauthorizations of Section 5.11
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The enforcement
provision states: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." Id. at § 2.
5. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
6. Barbara Arnwine, Voting Rights at a Crossroads: Return to the Past or an Oppor-
tunity, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 301, 30 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Arnwine, supra note 5, at 308-09.
8. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
9. Id. at 337.
10. Id. at 327-28.
ii. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526
(1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525
U.S. 266 (1999).
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The second standard is found in the case of City of Boerne v.
Flores,12 where the United States Supreme Court heightened its
scrutiny of legislation passed under the Fourteenth Amendment
and held that the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 199313 ("RFRA") exceeded congressional power.' 4 Relying
on the holding in Katzenbach v. Morgan,'5 the United States Su-
preme Court found that the enabling provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a "positive grant of legislative power"' 6 meant to
cure actual harm, but not a grant of power to "decree the sub-
stance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
states."' 7 For this reason, the Court held that, to support legisla-
tion applicable against the states, Congress was to provide a re-
cord of findings demonstrating a "congruence and proportionality"
between the alleged constitutional harm to be prevented and the
legislative means adopted to prevent such harm.'8
There can be no doubt that the original enactment of the VRA
and subsequent reauthorizations of Section 5 were rightly passed
pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment and were supported
strongly by a record of misconduct by the covered regions. How-
ever, in the past four decades, practically every aspect of the vot-
ing process has changed throughout the country.'9 Representation
in political offices has increased considerably among minorities. 20
Voter turnout and registration have increased far beyond the low
levels of involvement existing at the time of the original enact-
ment of the VRA.2' Most notably, however, the country has
elected its first African-American president, Barack Obama, "who
received a larger percentage of the white vote than each of the
previous two Democratic presidential nominees. 22
In light of these changes in the voting environment, the issue of
whether the preclearance requirement of Section 5 is constitu-
tional was recently presented to the District Court for the District
12. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, declared unconstituttional by Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578,
579 (5th Cir. 2009).
14. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
16. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
17. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
18. Id. at 520.
19. Appellant's Brief at 1, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
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of Columbia in the 2006 case of Northwest Austin Municipal Util-
ity District No. One v. Mukasey.23 There, a small utility district
located in Texas sought to bail out from the preclearance provi-
sions of Section 5.24 While the threshold argument was primarily
one of statutory construction, the utility district also sought an
alternative ruling that Section 5 was unconstitutional under the
City of Boerne standard.25 Employing Katzenbach's rational basis
review, the district court held that the reauthorization of Section 5
was within congressional power and ruled against the utility dis-
trict.26
The whole country watched closely after an appeal was made to
the United States Supreme Court.27 As a huge letdown, however,
the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question and re-
solved the matter on a less important threshold issue involving
statutory construction of the bailout language. 28 Strangely, as
though it had gotten cold feet, the Supreme Court invoked the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance, holding that, because the
threshold issue was resolved, there was no need to resolve the
weightier constitutional question of Section 5.29
The United States Supreme Court's unwillingness to address
the important constitutional issue means that a major unsettled
question concerning the scrutiny with which the Court will ana-
lyze Section 5 remains unanswered. While the Supreme Court's
decision clearly states that Section 5 "tests the outer boundaries of
its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority and may not be
constitutional ,"30 the Court's avoidance of the issue also means
that the statutory framework will, for the time being, remain in-
tact.
It is the opinion of the author that the preclearance require-
ments of Section 5 should be overturned. The most recent record
upon which Congress based its 2006 reauthorization falls short of
23. 573 F.Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
24. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 223.
25. Id. at 224.
26. Id. at 223-24.
27. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009). Here, the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on appeal from a three-judge panel as estab-
lished under 42 USC § 1973b(a)(5). Probable jurisdiction is the practice by the United
States Supreme Court whereby four of the justices agree to exercise the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Ohio v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959). The Court then considers the case anew.
Price, 360 U.S. at 247. Noting probable jurisdiction is very similar to granting a writ of
certiorari. Id. at 246.
28. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2516.
29. Id. at 2513.
30. Id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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indicating any current pattern of state defiance that still justifies
the use of such an expansive remedy and departure from our fed-
eral system.3' Additionally, there are no meaningful limitations
placed on the durational scope of Section 5's application. While
Section 5 was an amazing piece of human rights legislation that
brought about vast beneficial changes in the voting process, it is
not tailored to patterns of voting discrimination that might arise
in the present day. It is no longer constitutional.
II. HISTORY
A. Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees that the "right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."32 To ensure this guarantee, Congress has
the power to enact enforcement legislation.33 Any legislation en-
acted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, however, must be
carefully scrutinized to ensure that any intrusion on a state's right
to self-government is limited to the proper level of enforcement. 34
In 1965, Congress enacted the momentous Voting Rights Act
pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.35 Its primary purpose in
doing so was "to banish the blight of racial discrimination in vot-
ing, which had infected the electoral process in parts of our coun-
try for nearly a century."36 Importantly, prior to the enactment of
the VRA, Congress had carefully explored the problem of racial
discrimination in voting and generated a substantial record sup-
porting its findings.37
The record clearly revealed extensive abuses in many jurisdic-
tions. It showed that, almost immediately after the adoption of
the Fifteenth Amendment, blacks in the Deep South attempting to
exercise their constitutional right to vote were openly met with
systematic threats, intimidation, and extreme violence.38 The vio-
lence would continue over many decades, but would finally sub-
31. Id. at 2526.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
33. Id. at § 2.
34. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2520.
35. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 308-09.
38. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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side and be replaced by less obvious methods of disenfranchise-
ment, such as property qualifications, "good character' examina-
tions, and the now-infamous literacy tests.39 While over time, the
courts had declared most of these requirements unconstitutional,
many of the southern states simply ignored the rulings or evaded
the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment by readapting their meas-
ures to include requirements not addressed by the courts' deci-
sions.40 Not surprisingly, voter turnout among minorities in the
South equaled only a small percentage of the turnout among the
white population located in the same jurisdictions.41
The passage of the VRA was intended to remedy this historical
pattern of abuse. The VRA's primary substantive provision was
Section 2.42 This Section contained a prohibition on voting
discrimination, closely tracking the Fifteenth Amendment's guar-
antee against the abridgment or denial of the right to vote because
of race.43 Notably, Section 2 turned that guarantee into federal
law with practical applications intended to eliminate, once and for
all, the myriad techniques used by states to disenfranchise minori-
ties.44 Furthermore, federal legislation lessened the need for indi-
viduals to pursue long, costly litigation in pursuit of their Fif-
teenth Amendment rights.45 Instead, the whole process would be
controlled from the top down.
The VRA's most effective and well-known provision was Section
5.46 Acknowledged by Congress as a "substantial departure. .
from ordinary concepts of our federal system" 47 Section 5 requires
that certain covered48 jurisdictions obtain approval from the
United States Attorney General or the District Court for the Dis-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2522.
41. Id. at 2523.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
43. See id.
44. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
47. Hearing on S. 407 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 536 (1975) (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger).
48. In explaining covered jurisdictions, the Katzenbach Court stated:
The remedial sections of the Act. ... automatically apply to any State, or to any sepa-
rate political subdivision such as a county or parish, for which two findings have been
made: (1) the Attorney General has determined that on November 1, 1964, it main-
tained a 'test or device,' and (2) the Director of the Census has determined that less
than 50% of its voting age residents were registered on November 1, 1964, or voted in
the presidential election of November 1964. These findings are not reviewable in any
court and are final upon publication in the Federal Register.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1973b(b)).
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trict of Columbia before changing any aspect of their voting rules
or requirements. 49 Under Section 5, the presumption of validity
normally given by the courts to state actions is rejected, and state
officials carry the burden of proving that any changes made to
their election procedures will not have a discriminatory impact on
minorities in their jurisdiction. 50 If a covered region desires to
terminate coverage under Section 5, then Section 4 of the VRA
provides certain criteria that must be met to effectuate with-
drawal.51
Due to its high level of infringement on the rights normally af-
forded to the states, Section 5 was to be temporary in nature and
coverage was to lapse after five years. 52 Congress, however, reau-
thorized Section 5 on four different occasions. In 1970, Congress
extended Section 5 for an additional five years and, again, in 1975
for an additional seven years.53 In 1982, Congress reauthorized
Section 5 once again; however, this time the reenactment would
extend for an additional 25 years.54
As the 1982 reenactment approached the end of its extension
period, Congress began creating a fresh record in support of a new
reauthorization. During this time, congressional committees held
over twenty hearings and received testimony from many wit-
nesses.55 In the end, Congress created a record of over 15,000
pages in support of reauthorization, focusing largely on proving
that general racial discrimination had not been completely elimi-
nated.56
The most recent reauthorization of Section 5 occurred on July
27, 2006 in the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act and Reauthorization and Amendments
Act.57 Under this reauthorization, Section 5 was extended for an
additional 25 years, until 2031.58 Despite the positive changes it
brought within the covered jurisdictions, Section 5, it seems, was
left practically unchanged from its 1965 form.
49. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 225.
50. Id.
51. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2514.
52. Id. at 2510.
53. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400, 400.
54. Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat. 131, 133.
55. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp.2d at 228-29.
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 b(a)(8).
58. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp.2d at 229.
Winter 2010 3
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B. Northwest Austin Utility District No. One v. Holder: Two
Competing Standards
Eight days after the 2006 reauthorization, Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One 59 ("District") brought a suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against the Attorney General of the United States seeking its
right under Section 4 to obtain bailout from coverage.60 In the
alternative, District sought to obtain a declaration concerning
Congress's constitutional authority to enact Section 5.61 District
filed a motion for summary judgment on both claims, but a three-
judge panel denied District's motion, never addressing the ques-
tion of whether District satisfied the criteria for bailout.62 In-
stead, the panel held that, because District was a not a subdivi-
sion, it was not eligible for bailout in the first place. 63 The panel
held that the term "political subdivision" was meant to cover only
counties and governmental subdivisions that register voters. 64
In resolving the constitutional issue, the court identified two dif-
ferent standards used by the United States Supreme Court to re-
view federal legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. The first was the rational means stan-
dard employed by the Supreme Court in the 1966 case of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.65 The second standard was the stricter
congruence and proportionality standard, emerging in the later
1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores.66
In Katzenbach, South Carolina challenged the enactment of the
original VRA. 67 As set forth by the United States Supreme Court,
the issue was whether Congress had "exercised its powers under
the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation
to the States."68 To resolve this issue, the Katzenbach Court relied
59. "The district is a municipal utility district created under Texas law around 1987 to
perform certain governmental functions, including bond issuance for infrastructure con-
struction and tax assessment to service bond indebtedness, for a neighborhood built on
previously undeveloped land." Appellant's Brief, supra note 15, at 1 (citing Tex. Water
Code § 54.239).
60. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 223.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 283.
63. Id. at 230-35.
64. Id. at 231.
65. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
66. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
67. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323.
68. Id. at 324.
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on the holding in the seminal case of M'Culloch v. Maryland,69
which set forth an early justification for the rational basis test.70
In M'Culloch, Chief Justice John Marshall authored an opinion
stating clearly that, for statutes enacted pursuant to the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, the standard was simple: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 71
Applying that principal to its own controversy, the Katzenbach
Court held that Congress may use "any rational means to effectu-
ate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in vot-
ing."72 The Court then declared the VRA a legitimate remedy to a
century of systematic defiance of the Fifteenth Amendment. 73
Looking to Congress's voluminous record that it had amassed, the
Court recognized that minorities attempting to exercise their
rights to vote had been met by a subtle and persistent resistance
that had been systematically maintained in certain regions of the
United States.74 For this reason, the Court held that applying
Section 5 to a limited number of states was not unconstitutional
because its coverage formula was tailored to address this very spe-
cific problem. 75
After Katzenbach, the United States Supreme Court applied the
same rational basis standard in a variety of cases challenging the
constitutionality of the reauthorizations of the VRA. In both Ore-
gon v. Mitchel 76 and Georgia v. United States,77 the Supreme
Court applied the Katzenbach holding, reaffirming the VRA as an
acceptable exercise by Congress of Fifteenth Amendment power. 78
The Katzenbach holding was again applied in the seminal case
of City of Rome v. United States.79 In City of Rome, Rome, located
in the state of Georgia, argued that, because of the progress in the
area of minority voting participation, Section 5 had "outlived" its
utility where the harm that Congress had originally intended to
69. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
70. MCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
71. Id.
72. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
73. Id. at 337.
74. Id. at 308-13.
75. Id. at 327-28.
76. Oregon, 400 U.S. 112.
77. Georgia, 411 U.S. 526.
78. Id. at 535; Oregon, 400 U.S. at 131-34.
79. City of Rome, 446 U.S. 156.
Winter 2010 5
76 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
remedy had been largely eliminated.80 Rejecting this argument,
the Court found that Congress had amassed suitable evidence
demonstrating that the progress made in the area of voting dis-
crimination was still too "modest and spotty."18' Without stating
as much, the Supreme Court again applied a rational means stan-
dard, accepting outright the congressional judgment that the con-
tinued protections of the VRA were necessary to preserve its past
successes.82
Another significant application of the rational means test to the
VRA occurred in Lopez v. Monterey County.83 In this case, Mon-
terey County was designated as a covered jurisdiction for Section
5 purposes even though California, the state in which it was lo-
cated, was not covered by the Act. 84 Consequently, the County
challenged Section 5's application to itself as a subdivision of a
non-covered state after being required to implement changes in its
voting process as mandated by state law.8 5 In response, the Court
upheld Section 5 on the basis that its language did not limit its
application to discretionary acts. 86
Not surprisingly, the County had also asserted as part of its
claim that the VRA could not be made constitutionally applicable
against non-covered states, such as California, that had no history
of wrongdoing. 87 However, applying the Katzenbach rational
means test, once again, the Supreme Court held that Congress
was constitutionally permitted to designate covered regions under
Section 5 in order to remedy, not only discriminatory animus in
the electoral process, but also the less malicious "harmful effect of
neutral laws".88 The most notable aspect of this decision, however,
was not what it asserted but what it did not assert. As the district
court in Northwest Austin would later point out, this case was de-
cided in 1999, two years after City of Boerne, but never once did
the majority or dissent question the Katzenbach standard as the
relevant basis for review of Section 5.89
80. Id. at 180.
81. Id. at 181.
82. Id. at 182.
83. Lopez, 525 U.S. 266.
84. Id. at 271. "In 1971, Monterey County was designated a covered jurisdiction based
on findings that, as of November 1, 1968, the County maintained California's statewide
literacy test as a prerequisite to voting .. "Id.
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id. at 278.
87. Id. at 282.
88. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283.
89. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 239.
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While Katzenbach presented a highly deferential standard, the
later case of City of Boerne presented a more stringent standard of
review.90 In City of Boerne, Boerne, Texas denied the Archbishop
of San Antonio a permit to expand his church on the basis that it
was located in an historic preservation area.9' The Archbishop
sued local authorities for violation of his rights under the RFRA.92
The City responded that the RFRA was unconstitutional to the
extent it interfered with its local ordinance supporting the
preservation. 93  Ultimately, the district court ruled against
Archbishop Flores,94 and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed. 95
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
considered the question of whether Congress exceeded its powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment's enabling provisions by
enacting the RFRA and subjecting local ordinances to federal
regulation. 96 Applying stringent review, the Court in City of
Boerne deemed the connection between the statutory mandates of
the RFRA and the constitutional injuries it sought to prevent "out
of proportion."97 The Court also held that enforcement legislation
required a "congruence and proportionality" between a constitu-
tional injury and the means adopted to prevent that injury.98 The
remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment permitted
Congress to cure reoccurring constitutional violations but did not
sanction Congress to make substantive changes to the law. 99
The Court held that the RFRA could not meet these require-
ments. 00 First, the congressional record did not reveal one state
law that actually led to religious persecution.' 0' Instead, the re-
cord revealed only accidental burdens on religion. 02 Furthermore,
Congress's failure to include a deadline, coupled with the exten-
sive reach of the statute, led the Court to view the RFRA as going
well beyond the scope of a remedial law.' 03 During its analysis,
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.




95. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 532.
98. Id. at 520.
99. Id. at 519-20.
100. City of Boerne, 512 U.S. at 532.
101. Id. at 530.
102. Id. at 530.
103. Id. at 532.
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the United States Supreme Court contrasted Section 5 of the VRA
with the RFRA, holding up the VRA as an example of proper legis-
lation. 04 To explain why Section 5 was proper, the Court noted
that it had been tailored only to apply to those regions where vio-
lations regularly occurred, had provided a method for bailout, and
had included a termination date. 05
After considering the two contrasting standards in Katzenbach
and City of Boerne, the district court in Northwest Austin held that
the Katzenbach standard was applicable. 06 First, the district
court noted that City of Boerne repeatedly described the VRA as
congruent and proportional. 0 7 Even though it could have easily
done so, the Boerne Court never stated that Katzenbach's rational
basis standard no longer governed challenges to legislation in-
tended to remedy voting discrimination. 0 8 In fact, no voting
rights discrimination was even at issue in City of Boerne. 109
Second, the district court noted that, in Lopez, a case decided
two years after City of Boerne, the Court denied a constitutional
challenge that Section 5 violated the doctrine of federalism, citing
the more deferential Katzenbach rational means test as the true
standard."10 The district court stated that, despite the fact the
City of Boerne standard had already been adopted by the United
States Supreme Court, the Court in Lopez did not apply that stan-
dard to its Section 5 challenge.'
After upholding the Katzenbach standard as the appropriate
one, the district court addressed the City of Boerne standard in the
alternative. The district court held that, even if it applied the
congruence and proportionality standard of Katzenbach, Congress
had properly documented evidence sufficient to prove that racial
disparities still existed at a higher rate in the covered regions"12
and that the remedy for these disparities had been narrowly tai-
lored. 13 Thus, under the alternative standard, Section 5 was still
constitutionally compliant.
104. Id. at 532-33.
105. City of Boerne, 512 U.S. at 532-33.
106. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 224.
107. Id. at 242.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Lopez. 525 U.S. at 282-83.
111. Nw. Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 239.
112. Id. at 247-65.
113. Id. at 268-69.
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the majority
took a very different approach. Acknowledging the irrefutable,
historic successes of the VRA, the Court then agreed with North-
west Austin Municipal Utility District, stating clearly that the
VRA now raises genuine constitutional concerns."14 The Supreme
Court opined that many of the historical problems it had accepted
as support for Katzenbach and its progeny had been successfully
remedied."15 Nevertheless, because the district had presented the
question concerning bailout, the Court was able to resolve the case
without directly addressing the more important constitutional is-
sue. Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,"16 the
Court opted not to address the issue directly, and instead ruled
that political subdivisions were permitted to seek a bailout under
the language of the statute."17
III. ANALYSIS
A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is No Longer Tailored to
Remedy Current Patterns of Voting Discrimination
In his lone dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas raised serious
doubts about whether Section 5 is still tailored to remedy current
patterns of discrimination." 8 Noting that Section 5's preclearance
requirement is "one of the most extraordinary remedial provisions
in an Act noted for its broad remedies,""19 Justice Thomas went on
to describe Section 5 as a great deviation from the central notion
of the American federal system. 20 Considering Section 5's level of
encroachment on the sovereignty of the covered states, such an
observation must be conceded as true. This departure from the
norm is especially worrying because of the way that it impairs the
key values of self-determination and self-government by the peo-
ple of a state.
Advocates for reenactment of Section 5 maintain that, without
the remedial provisions of this law, the covered jurisdictions would
114. Northwest Austin, 1295S. Ct. at 2511-12.
115. Id.at 2511.
116. Invoking the doctrine, the Court noted that "it is ... well established .. . that nor-
mally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon
which to dispose of the case." Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984).
117. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2516.
118. Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2524. (quoting United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
120. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2524 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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backslide and return to their discriminatory ways. 121 Such specu-
lation alone, however, has never been sufficient to uphold legisla-
tion passed pursuant to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
This is because the Constitution does not support an encroach-
ment by the federal government on a state's fundamental right to
self-determination solely in an effort to prevent a future return to
conditions that have already been remedied. 122 Furthermore, the
Constitution does not support such an intrusion as a penalty for
past defiance. 23 As rightly observed by Justice Thomas, "[m]ore
than 40 years after its enactment, this intrusion has become in-
creasingly difficult to justify. 124
Interestingly, there seems to be no real need for the United
States Supreme Court to rule directly on whether Katzenbach or
Boerne is controlling. As a condition to Section 5's "uncommon
exercise of congressional power," 25 the United States Supreme
Court, even under the stricter Katzenbach standard, would be re-
quired to examine the congressional record to determine whether
there has been a systematic constitutional defiance. 26 Even as-
suming Katzenbach was the accepted standard, various stray acts
alone would not be enough to support federal legislation passed
pursuant to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 127 Thus,
absent current evidence that the covered jurisdictions are likely to
engage in the type of discrimination that supported the original
enactment of Section 5, there would be no basis, under either
standard, for continuing legislation that so vastly encroaches upon
the historical rights of the states to self-government.
The most recent statistics concerning political participation by
minorities reveal that systematic voting discrimination no longer
pervades the covered jurisdictions. 2 8 There is simply no evidence
121. See, e.g., Reaction of Senator Leahy to the Supreme Court's Decision on Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, http:/Ieahy.senate.gov/press/200906/062209a.html (last visited Jan.
28, 2010).
122. Id. at 2525.
123. Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2524
125. Id. at 2523 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334.35).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In his dissent, Justice Thomas provides this rather strong evidence:
The current statistical evidence confirms that the emergency that prompted the enactment
of § 5 has long since passed. By 2006, the voter registration rates for blacks in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi had jumped to 71.8%, 66.9%, and 72.2%, respectively. There-
fore, in contrast to the Katzenbach Court's finding that the 'registration of voting-age
whites ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead of Negro registration' in these
States in 1964, since that time this disparity has nearly vanished. In 2006, the disparity
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that these particular states and localities continue to direct cam-
paigns of intimidation against black voters, and there is no evi-
dence that these particular jurisdictions are attempting to employ
the unfair testing devices, such as property ownership clauses,
once used to systematically disqualify minorities.129 Furthermore,
there is no evidence that these jurisdictions stand ready to return
to their defiant ways.' 30 To the contrary, we are now just as likely
to find a voting discrimination case in a non-covered jurisdiction
as we are to find one in a covered jurisdiction. 131
B. The United States Supreme Court Takes the Easy Way Out
While one can speculate about whether or not the United States
Supreme Court had, at the time it accepted the case, actually in-
tended to rule on the constitutional issue presented in Northwest
Austin, one thing is certain: the United Supreme Court resisted
the obvious temptation to strike down Section 5 and left the issue
for the Court to resolve in the future. While the latest renewal of
Section 5 is not set to expire until the year 2031,132 in choosing to
sidestep the issue, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Northwest Austin did nothing to ensure that it will last for that
duration.
Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme
Court stopped short of actually declaring Section 5 to violate the
constitution. 3 3 Yet for reasons that the majority never expressly
stated, the Supreme Court went through considerable lengths to
spell out Section 5's constitutional weaknesses and doctrinal viola-
tions. In fact, the majority opinion reads like a laundry list of con-
stitutional challenges to Section 5. First, the opinion speaks
plainly about Section 5's race-conscious nature and examined the
costs imposed by Section 5 on the key American tenets of
federalism and equality of state sovereignty.134 Second, the
majority suggested strongly that the electoral conditons for
was only 3 percentage points in Alabama, 8 percentage points in Louisiana, and in Missis-
sippi, black voter registration actually exceeded white voter registration by 1.5 percentage
points. In addition, blacks in these three covered States also have higher registration
numbers than the registration rate for whites in noncovered states.
Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 2525.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2512.
132. Northwest Austin, 573 F.Supp. 2d at 229.
133. Holder, 129 S. ct. at 2513.
134. Id. at 2510-13.
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minorities in the covered jurisdictions has improved and that the
coverage formula is outdated. 35 While these issues have been
raised and rejected in prior challenges, by restating them in
Northwest Austin, the Roberts Court sends a strong signal that it
would be willing to entertain these challenges in the future.
C. What Comes Next?
For the time being, Section 5 remains in full effect. However,
the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District will return to the
district court for a determination about whether or not it may
obtain a bailout. 36 While hardly the victory that most states'
rights advocates were seeking, there is still one beneficial effect of
the ruling in Northwest Austin. After this decision, a larger group
of covered jurisdictions may now seek to bailout from Section 5.
Still, whether or not bailouts are granted to any individual
district, it seems highly likely, given the alarms sounded by the
majority, that a new wholesale challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 5 will soon be forthcoming. Considering the mood of the
Roberts Court as expressed in Northwest Austin, it is likely that
the offending portions of Section 5, if left unmodified by Congress,
will be declared unconstitutional.
Another result of the decision in Northwest Austin is that Con-
gress will be forced to reconsider Section 5 of the VRA. One of the
most logical ways to interpret the majority's decision in Northwest
Austin is that it is a warning to Congress to reassess the coverage
formula set forth in Section 5 and to stop disproportionately apply-
ing the mandates of the VRA to states that have long since made
atonement for the sins of their past. In fact, this seems to be the
only sensible way to interpret a decision that states a desire to
avoid the constitutionality of a particular statute then goes
through great lengths to discuss it. It is as though the Court is
issuing to Congress an advisory opinion about how it will rule in
the future and a lesson on how to avoid the ruling.
Ultimately, Congress has a decision to make. If it modifies Sec-
tion 5 to meet the requirements of the majority, then the statute
will likely survive, albeit in a weaker form. However, if Congress
chooses not to modify Section 5, then it runs the risk that many of
the current Supreme Court Justices will still be on the bench at
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2517.
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the time the challenge is raised. If this occurs, it is likely that
Section 5 will be stricken in its entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nobody can doubt that Section 5 of the VRA is one of the most
effective pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted; nor can any
person doubt the benefits that it has brought to our society. By
imposing strict government oversight on the most discriminatory
voting jurisdictions, Section 5 single-handedly brought about ex-
tensive progress in the area of voting rights by improving minority
participation in the electoral process and increasing minority rep-
resentation throughout those jurisdictions. However, it must be
acknowledged that, by doing its job, Section 5 may no longer be
needed in its current form.
This is not to say that striking Section 5 would, in any way, con-
stitute a defeat. To the contrary, considering Section 5's extensive
role in breaking the cycle of oppressiveness at the polls, it appears
that Section 5 is a conclusive victory-a fulfillment of the promise
of the Fifteenth Amendment.
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